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1 Introduction
Globalization has received considerable attention in the political economy literature. One
reason is that deliberate political actions such as trade liberalization and the abandonment
of international capital controls have promoted the emergence of globalization. However, the
true driving force behind globalization are technological advances in transportation, commu-
nication, and the processing of information that are only weakly influenced by policy-makers
(James, 2002).1 An alternative explanation for the concentration of globalization research
in the political economy literature is the content of this research focusing on the vices and
virtues of globalization’s influence on public policy. More specifically, many contributions
investigate whether a higher degree of global economic integration has changed the scope and
limits of policy-making (Schulze and Ursprung, 1999).
From the public finance perspective, the literature highlights the implications of global-
ization for governments’ ability to collect tax revenue. The main hypothesis investigated is
whether the loss of governments’ monopoly of coercion and strategic interactions with other
governments competing for fiscal revenues has affected the design of tax systems (Aizenman
and Jinjarak, 2009; Dreher, 2006b; Hines and Summers, 2009). This includes the question
whether taxes have shifted from mobile production factors such as capital to less mobile factors
such as labor (Rodrik, 1997; Schwarz, 2007; Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986). Even though
such investigations are very enlightening, it should not be overlooked that labor nowadays also
more easily transcends national borders, albeit not as much as capital. In this context, one
may wonder whether governments have adjusted the composition of education expenditures
given that especially high-skilled labor is considered to be mobile (Docquier and Marfouk,
2006; Egger and Radulescu, 2009; Grogger and Hanson, forthcoming).
Following such considerations, this paper investigates the effect of globalization on the
composition of public education expenditures. First, we derive in a median voter setting that
governments’ readjustments of educational policies due to globalization are determined by the
extent to which global economic integration affects (i) wages for different types of labor and
(ii) the domestic tax rate. On the one hand, governments have an incentive to invest more
resources in tertiary education if globalization increases the wages of high-skilled workers.
This would lead to a larger tax base and as a result the median voter would receive more
transfer payments. On the other hand, globalization intensifies tax competition and thereby
diminishes governments’ ability to finance generous transfers to the median voter. From this
perspective, it is likely that governments reduce funding for educational programs that do
not directly benefit the median voter such as higher education. The overall effect identified
1Cohen (1996) refers to political-driven versus technology-driven globalization as the “liberal” and “realist”
models. In addition, he mentions two other perspectives emphasizing the role of the domestic political process
and the importance of political culture and belief systems, respectively.
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in the theoretical discussion is, however, that governments spend less on primary relative to
tertiary education with a higher level of global economic integration.
Since the theoretical discussion suggests the existence of two effects that go in opposite
directions, the net effect of globalization on the government’s educational priorities is clearly
an empirical matter, which is adressed in the second part of the paper. The dynamic panel
analysis is based on System GMM estimations and uses data for 121 countries over the 1992
- 2006 period. The estimation results reveal that globalization has induced governments
in developed as well as developing countries to increase spending for tertiary relative to
primary education. Most likely, students from socio-economically disadvantaged backgrounds
benefit predominantly from primary education expenditures, while students with a wealthy
background benefit from tertiary education expenditures (Blanden and Machin, 2004; Hansen
and Weisbrod, 1969). We therefore conclude that the effect of globalization on the composition
of public education expenditures may widen the gap between rich and poor in the long-run.2
While the shift in educational priorities towards higher education reduces equity, the
effect from an efficiency point of view is ambiguous.3 In the context of our theoretical model,
the allocation of more public resources to higher education is optimal from the viewpoint
of the government since it seeks to be re-elected and therefore maximizes the welfare of the
median voter. However, if one regards this issue more broadly from an efficiency perspective,
additional insights are gained. On the one hand, there is evidence for developing countries that
the ’social rate of return’ to public resources invested at the primary level is higher than for
public expenditures on higher education levels (Carnoy, 1992; Lockheed and Verspoor, 1991;
Psacharopoulos, 1985).4 This would suggest that the observed shift in educational priorities
is inefficient. On the other hand, a higher share of tertiary education expenditures can be
justified from an efficiency perspective by pointing out that an increasingly technology-driven
world characterized by fierce international competition requires more high-skilled labor.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the exist-
ing literature on the linkages between globalization and education expenditures. In section
3, we discuss the relationship between globalization and public expenditures for primary, sec-
ondary, and tertiary education in the context of a theoretical model. Section 4 presents the
data and the empirical strategy, while we explore the effect of globalization on the composi-
tion of public education expenditures empirically in section 5. Second 6 concludes the analysis.
2Wa¨lde (2000) explains the positive relationship between the share of primary education expenditures and
income inequality by deriving that a higher share of secondary and tertiary expenditures provides incentives
for the development of technologies. These technologies in turn lead to a replacement of unskilled by skilled
labor that gives rise to a higher extent of income inequality.
3For a distinction between competitiveness-, finance- and equity-driven educational reforms due to global-
ization see Carnoy (1999).
4Note that Birdsall (1996) challenges the prevalent view that public resources for education in developing
countries should be reallocated from higher to lower levels of education. Her main argument is that the
available measures for social rates of returns to education do not capture all relevant dimensions.
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2 Globalization and public education: a literature review
The implications of globalization for public education are studied in several social sciences,
each of which emphasize different aspects of educational policies.5 The sociological and peda-
gogical literature primarily analyze how globalization affects structural aspects of public edu-
cation systems. More specifically, the main questions that are investigated are whether global-
ization leads to a convergence of nationally diverse educational systems (Green, 1999), whether
it causes a “commodification”6 of education (Naidoo and Jamieson, 2005), and whether it
increases the influence of international organizations on educational systems, especially in
developing countries (McNeely, 1995).
While the analysis of globalization’s influence on different aspects of educational policies
brings to light interesting insights, one has to acknowledge that there are many of these
measures. Hence, an analysis that is intended to analyze the overall effect of globalization on
educational policies needs to be based on a more aggregated measure. To this end, researchers
usually resort to data for public spending on education. The impact of globalization on
public education expenditures is primarily analyzed within the fields of economics and political
science. The relevant theoretical contributions can be subdivided into two groups linking
globalization with education expenditures through two distinct channels. The first strand
of the literature is based on the tax competition perspective. In this view, globalization is
understood to increase the mobility of the high-skilled, which impedes the government’s ability
to tax these high-income earners. The reduction of the tax base has in turn an influence on
public education expenditures.
One example for the tax competition approach is a study by Anderson and Konrad (2003)
that analyzes theoretically how globalization affects private education effort and public edu-
cation polices under the assumption of a Leviathan government. In their model, governments
can decrease the private costs of education by appropriate public policies (which can be un-
derstood as expenditures) and thus motivate individuals to acquire more education. More
educated individuals earn a higher wage and thus provide a larger tax base, but they also
have the ability to emigrate if the domestic tax-rate is too high. The authors derive that, in
general, it cannot be determined whether globalization induces the government to decrease
the private costs of education. This would suggest that there is no theoretical link between
globalization and total education expenditures.
A second contribution comes from Haupt and Janeba (2009) who assume that the gov-
ernment seeks to redistribute income from high- to low-skilled individuals. The income redis-
5For an overview of recent research on the relationship between globalization on education that covers
several academic disciplines see Spring (2008).
6Education is generally regarded as a means for social development, democratic empowerment and the
advancement of well-being and economic development of societies. The term “commodification” of education
refers to the fact that education is increasingly understood as an economic factor, while students are looked
upon primarily as consumers of education serving as human capital for the labor market.
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tribution is indirectly achieved by providing the high-skilled with education subsidies. As a
result, the future income of the high-skilled increases and this in turn causes the tax base to
become larger. The derivations suggest that globalization reduces public education subsidies
since high-skilled individuals can emigrate more easily in a globalized world. This forces the
government to lower the tax rate in equilibrium. To conclude, an increase in the tax base
due to public education expenditures does not benefit the low-skilled as much as it does in a
world with closed economies. This provides the government with an incentive to reduce total
education spending in an increasingly globalized world.
Poutvaara (2008) provides an extension to the two studies mentioned above by making
a distinction between different subjects that are taught in higher education institutions. He
argues that governments are aware of the increasing difficulty of taxation due to the threat
of emigration. Therefore, governments react to globalization by reducing funding for fields
of studies where the skills acquired are internationally transferable such as engineering. At
the same time, governments provide more financial resources for subjects that are country-
specific, such as law. This shift of education spending between different fields of studies is a
valuable extension to previous investigations. However, due to the difficulty of obtaining data
for such a detailed analysis, there is so far no empirical evidence in favor of this hypothesis.
The empirical evidence regarding globalization’s effect on total education expenditures
is mixed, which is not surprising given the disagreements in the theoretical literature. Dreher
et al. (2008) find that globalization has not changed the share of education expenditures in
total public expenditures. In contrast, Avelino et al. (2005) find that trade openness was
positively related to education spending in Latin America during the 1980 - 1999 period.
Busemeyer (2007) uses trade openness as a control variable in a panel data study on the
influence of partisan politics on education expenditures in 21 OECD countries. He finds that
total education expenditures were positively related to openness during the nineties, and that
globalization has increased expenditures for all stages of education, but primarily for tertiary
education. Shelton (2007) tests a large number of determinants of public education expendi-
tures simultaneously in order to avoid omitted variable bias. His analysis provides evidence
that globalization does not have an effect on public education expenditures. One reason why
most of these studies fail to identify a significant effect of global economic integration on
educational policies is that these effects can only be observed at lower levels of aggregation.
The second strand of the theoretical literature emphasizes the implications of increased
trade on wages for low- and high-skilled labor and discusses how this distortion in wages af-
fects educational policies. This perspective allows for an analysis of globalization’s influence
on the composition of education expenditures rather than aggregate spending on education.
A study by Ansell (2008), as the only theoretical contribution on this question, bases the
analysis entirely on the Heckscher-Ohlin model and derives that the impact of globalization
on education expenditures differs between developed and developing countries. In develop-
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ing countries, primary education expenditures are expected to increase relative to tertiary
education expenditures, whereas the opposite effect is expected for developed countries.
Based on estimations with country averages over the 1990s, Ansell (2008) finds confir-
mation for the implications of the theoretical analysis. However, the investigation neglects
the dynamics of both globalization and the composition of public education expenditures.
In addition, given the large number of studies that refute the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem with
regard to globalization’s predicted influence on wages (Feenstra and Hanson, 1999; Goldberg
and Pavenik, 2007), the theoretical foundation for Ansell’s findings is rather weak.
The above literature review illustrates that the bulk of the literature examining global-
ization’s influence on public education emphasizes the role of tax competition. In addition,
it has to be noted that the studies in the tax competition literature focus on the effect of
globalization on total education expenditures while neglecting potential effects on the com-
position of education expenditures. The only study analyzing globalization’s influence on the
composition of public education expenditures that we know of is exclusively based on the
Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. However, this theorem hardly finds confirmation in the empirical
literature. Moreover, evidence in favor of this theoretical model by Ansell is exclusively based
on a cross-sectional investigation.
The contribution of our paper is that we address each of the aforementioned shortcom-
ings. First, we derive a theoretical model that emphasizes increased tax competition due to
global economic integration, while also taking into account globalization’s effect on wages as
identified in the empirical literature. Second, we apply the theoretical model in order to in-
vestigate globalization’s influence on the shares of primary, secondary and tertiary education.
In this context, we make use of the common assumption that high-skilled individuals are more
mobile than low-skilled individuals. Third, we conduct our estimations with panel data and
apply dynamic estimation techniques in order to make use of the variation over time in our
dataset. Fourth, we use the shares of primary, secondary and tertiary education as dependent
variables rather than total education expenditures.
3 Theoretical model
3.1 Individuals
In a country with a population mass of unity, a generic individual i disposes of an exogenously
given ability βi that qualifies her for a certain type of labor. The wage that this individual
earns for one unit of (effective) labor amounts to wi, while there is a strictly positive rela-
tionship between ability and wages, i. e., wi = wi(βi) with dwi/dβi > 0.
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The effective labor supply pi of an individual i depends on the amount of public ex-
penditures gi the government invests in her education. More specifically, we assume that
pi = pi(gi) with dpi/dgi > 0, d2pi/dg2i < 0, and dpi/dg−i = 0. Public education expenditures
are therefore assumed to be productivity-enhancing.
Based on these considerations, individual i’s market income νi can be specified as:
νi(wi, gi) = wipi(gi), (3.1)
with dνi/dwi > 0, dνi/dgi > 0, and d2νi/dgidwi > 0. In other words, increasing wages and an
increasing effective productivity because of increased funding for education raise the market
income of individual i. Moreover, the cross derivative of income with respect to wages and
education expenditures is positive.
3.1.1 Consumption
In addition to the market income described in equation 3.1, an individual’s consumption level
is determined by her tax rate and the redistributive transfers she might receive. We assume
that every individual is faced with a proportional tax rate t, while the redistributive transfers
are only paid to the median voter. Moreover, in contrast to the tax rate, public education
expenditures gi may vary between individuals.
As a result, the net-consumption yi of a generic individual i can be expressed as:
yi = (1− t)νi(wi, gi). (3.2)
In comparison, the net-consumption of the median voter amounts to:
ym = (1− t)νm(wm, gm) + r, (3.3)
where r denotes the transfer paid to the median voter.
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3.1.2 Emigration
In a world with global economic integration, the government has to take into account that
high-income individuals may emigrate if the tax burden is relatively high.7 To model an
individual’s mobility decision, we presume that the government can commit to a tax rate but
not to an allocation of expenditures. An individual therefore only takes the tax rate into
account when deciding on whether to emigrate or not.
She will remain in the home country if the following condition holds:
(1− t)wi + i ≥ (1− tF )wF − x, (3.4)
with t denoting the domestic tax rate and wFi and tF representing the wage and tax rate in case
the individual emigrates to another jurisdiction (the “foreign” wage and tax rate). Moreover,
x denotes the mobility costs, i.e. the costs that are incurred in the case of emigration (will
be discussed in more detail in section 3.4.2), while i is a random parameter measuring the
home attachment of individual i with  ∼ U(0, b). Individual i will emigrate if the sum of her
net-wage and the home attachment is larger than the net-wage she would earn in the foreign
country minus the mobility costs. For simplicity, we treat in the following the foreign tax rate
and the foreign wage as exogenously given and fixed.
Given that i is random, individual i’s mobility decision is stochastic. The probability
pii that individual i will remain in the country can be expressed as a function of the domestic
tax rate, the domestic wage, and the mobility costs:
pii(t, wi, x) = F ( ≥ z) = 1− 1
b
z, (3.5)
with z = (1− tF )wF − (1− t)wi − x,
dpii/dt = −1bwi < 0,
dpii/dx = 1b > 0,
and dpii/dwi = (1− t) > 0.
7The assumption that the production factors are supplied endogenously implies an alternative tax base
effect. We ignore this effect in order to keep the model tractable. A second concern with the above assumptions
is that not only high- but also low-skilled individuals may respond to fiscal-policy incentives. However, there
is evidence that the high-skilled are in this regard more mobile than the low-skilled (Docquier and Marfouk,
2006; Egger and Radulescu, 2009; Grogger and Hanson, forthcoming). Moreover, given that several countries
implement “quality-selective” immigration policies and actively discourage low-skilled migration into welfare
state institutions by legal barriers, it is probably reasonable to assume that fiscal polices are rather used to
attract and retain high-skilled than to “ward off” low-skilled immigrants.
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3.2 The government
The government seeks to be re-elected and is therefore exclusively concerned with the con-
sumption possibilities of the median voter i = m.8 The government’s objective function is set
up accordingly:
max
gi,t,r
W = (1− t)νm(wm, gm) + r (3.6)
with gi ≥ 0, t ≥ 0, r ≥ 0.
The government has to ensure that expenditures do not exceed revenues when maximiz-
ing the above objective function, while in turn both of these variables depend on the tax rate
the governments chooses. The balanced budget constraint can in summary be expressed as:∫ 1
0
(
pii(t, wi, x)tνi(wi, gi)− gi
)
di− r = 0 (3.7)
Thus, the income of the other individuals is only of interest to the government as far as it
leads to higher transfers to the median voter.
3.3 Equilibrium
In the following, concentrate on equilibria with strictly positive transfers (r > 0) and assume
that the median voter remains in the country (she will not emigrate irrespective of any
wage differentials). Our objective is to derive expressions for the government’s three decision
variables in equilibrium: the respective level of education expenditures, the tax rate, and the
redistributive transfers. We start with the equilibrium education expenditures for the median
voter which can be expressed as:
dνm
dgm
− 1 = 0. (3.8)
Equation 3.8 states that in equilibrium, the increase in the median voter’s income due to a
marginal increase in education expenditures is equal to the marginal costs, which are 1.
In comparison, education expenditures for all other individuals are characterized by:
t
dνi
dgi
− 1 = 0 ∀ i 6= m. (3.9)
Thus, the increase in tax revenues due to a marginal increase in education expenditures should
be equal to the costs, which are 1.
8The idea that governments maximize the median voter’s utility was originally introduced by Black (1948)
and Downs (1957) to illustrate the stylized fact that electoral competition between political parties creates a
bias towards centrist policies. We use this idea as the basis of our theoretical model due to its strong empirical
support (Congleton and Bennett, 1995; Congleton and Shughart, 1990; Poole and Daniels, 1985).
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The second decision variable of the government, which applies to all individuals including
the median voter, is the equilibrium tax rate, which can be represented by the following
expression:
− νm +
∫ 1
0
(
dpii
dt
tνi + piiνi
)
di = 0. (3.10)
Hence, the equilibrium tax rate is characterized by the fact that the emigration-induced
expected decrease in tax revenues when the tax rate is raised marginally is slightly outweighed
(that is, by νm) by the increase in revenues.
The third decision variable of the government, i.e. the amount of redistributive transfers
r in equilibrium, is determined residually as total revenues minus total education expenditures.
3.4 Globalization
In the following, we analyze how globalization affects the equilibrium characterized by equa-
tion (3.8)-(3.10). Globalization has two effects in the context of this model as global economic
integration affects wages (section 3.4.1) and reduces the costs of mobility (section 3.4.2).
3.4.1 Globalization and wages
Trade theory suggests a link between the extent of economic integration and factor returns.
The Heckscher-Ohlin model and the related Stolper-Samuelson theorem as the central con-
tributions on this topic state that falling trade restrictions lead to an equalization of factor
prizes through an increase in the trade of final goods (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2005).
As an extension to the discusssion in section 3.1, we therefore model the wage of a generic
individual i as a function of her ability βi as well as globalization G, i. e.:
wi = wi(βi, G). (3.11)
How does globalization affect the wage for individual i or put differently, what is the sign of
dwi/dG? According to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, the sign of this expression will depend
on (i) the skill level of individual i and (ii) the development status of the country that the
individual lives in. Given that industrialized countries have a relative abundance in high-
skilled labor, while developing countries face a relative abundance in unskilled labor, one
implication of the Heckscher-Ohlin model is that the returns to low-skilled labor will increase
in developing and decrease in industrialized countries with deepening globalization, and vice
versa for high-skilled labor.
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The empirical evidence, however, only partially confirms the predictions of the Heckscher-
Ohlin model. Several studies suggest that global economic integration has led to a relative
rise in wages for high-skilled labor in industrialized countries (Feenstra and Hanson, 1999)
and developing countries (Goldberg and Pavenik, 2007). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume
that d2wi/dβidG > 0 for any country irrespective of the country’s development status.
3.4.2 Mobility costs
The mobility costs x (see equation 3.4) can be understood as the monetary representation
of the difficulty of keeping in touch with one’s social and professional networks, and as the
pecuniary costs of relocating physical assets. One consequence of global economic integration
is certainly a reduction in transportation costs, which implies that it becomes easier to visit
one’s acquaintances in the home country, or to relocate physical assets. Another effect is the
ongoing spread of English as a modern Lingua Franca and the emergence of a common global
culture, both of which might reduce the non-monetary costs of moving to a foreign country.
It is therefore reasonable to assume that mobility costs are a decreasing function of the extent
of globalization, i.e. x = x(G) with dx/dG < 0.
3.5 Globalization and public education
By implicitly differentiating equation (3.8) with respect to G, we can analyze the effect of
globalization on educational expenditures for programs that benefit the median voter:
dgm
dG
= −
(
d2νm
dg2m
)−1
d2νm
dgmdwm
dwm
dG
. (3.12)
The sign of this expression depends only on the sign of dwm/dG, i. e., how globalization affects
the returns to the type of labor supplied by the median voter. The government increases
funding for educational programs that benefit the median voter if the returns to the type of
labor that she supplies increase, and vice versa.
The effect of globalization on education expenditures for the remaining individuals is
more complicated. Implicitly differentiating equation (3.9) and using the fact that in any
equilibrium dνi/dgi = 1/t gives:
dgi
dG
= −
(
1
t
dt
dG
+ t
d2νi
dwidgi
dwi
dG
)(
t
d2νi
dg2i
)−1
. (3.13)
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This expression reveals that the effect of globalization on the amount of education expen-
diture for individual i works through two distinct channels: (i) its effect on the wage for
that type of labor that individual i supplies and (ii) its effect on the domestic tax rate.
The wage effect may vary between individuals. In particular, the sign of dwi/dG is likely
to differ between high-skilled and low-skilled individuals. The available empirical evidence
indicates that dwi/dG is positive for high-skilled and negative for low-skilled individuals in
both industrialized and developing countries. Thus, this effect of globalization should in-
centivize governments to increase expenditures for higher educational programs and reduce
expenditures for basic education.
On the other hand, the tax effect on education expenditures is the same for all i 6= m.
However, t is an endogenous variable so that the sign of dt/dG has to be determined within the
system. It is unclear whether it will be positive or negative. Implicitly differentiating equation
(3.10) reveals that globalization has two effects on the domestic tax rate (see appendix A for
the derivation). First, it changes individual i’s probability of emigration. Second, it has an
effect on incomes, a direct one through its effect of wages and an indirect one through its
effect on education expenditures. Intuitively, if globalization increases gross income, then
the tax base increases and the government has an incentive to raise the domestic tax rate.
On the other hand, by decreasing mobility costs, globalization provides governments with an
incentive to lower the domestic tax rate in order to limit emigration.
Especially because of its indeterminate effect on the tax rate, the effect of globalization
on absolute education expenditures is ambiguous. However, the previous discussion of the
wage effects of globalization suggests that globalization induces governments in industrialized
and developing countries to increase expenditure for higher educational programs relative to
lower educational programs. We test this implication of our model in the next section empir-
ically on the basis of the composition of public education expenditures.
4 Data and methodology
4.1 Data description
The education expenditure data is obtained from the World Bank’s Edstats database, where
the original source for this data is the UNESCO Institute of Statistics. The data is compre-
hensive in the sense that all education-relevant expenditures of public entities are covered,
including expenditures by different tiers of government (Lassibille and Rasera, 1998). Figure
1 is based on averages for developing and developed countries across the period from 1992 till
2006. The two pie charts illustrate to what extent the allocation of education expenditures
on average differs between these two country groups.
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Figure 1: Composition of public education expenditures, 1992 - 2006
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Figure 1 suggests that OECD countries spend a smaller share of total education expenditures
(26.6%) on primary education than developing countries (38.3%). This can be attributed to
the fact that the average level of education is lower in developing countries with a large share
of the population only receiving basic education. This difference in education levels is also
confirmed with regard to the shares of secondary and tertiary education expenditures. While
OECD countries spend on average 39.0% and 21.9% of the funds available for education on
secondary and tertiary education, these shares only amount to 31.6% and 17.7% in developing
countries, respectively.
To measure globalization, we use two proxies: the KOF-Index introduced by Dreher
(2006a) and the trade openness measure (openness at constant prices) from the Penn World
Tables. The KOF-Index is based on three sub-indexes which capture the extent of economic,
social, and political globalization. The overall index of globalization is therefore based on
a number of measures that capture actual economic flows, economic restrictions, data on
information flows, data on personal contact, and data on cultural proximity. The KOF-
Index may therefore provide a more comprehensive picture than the traditionally used trade
openness measure. Nonetheless, we also use the trade openness measure from the Penn World
Tables as a second proxy for global economic integration to check for the robustness of the
results. The evolution of the country-averages of these two measures of globalization from
1992 onwards is plotted separately for developed and developing countries in figure 2.
Both the KOF-Index and the trade openness measure on average suggest increasing
globalization for the two country groups, while the trade openness measure exhibits more
variation over time than the KOF-Index. Moreover, the extent of trade openness is higher
for developing than for developed countries throughout the entire period from 1992 to 2006.
This observation can be attributed to the fact that poor countries are much more dependent
12
on international trade. In contrast, the KOF-Index is generally by about 20 points higher in
developed than in developing countries, which may imply that for instance in terms of cul-
tural proximity and information flows wealthy countries are more globalized. The differences
between the two globalization measures are the reason why we choose to use both of them in
our regression analysis.
Figure 2: Evolution of globalization over time, 1992 - 2006
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The first control variable that we include is the dependent variable lagged by one period
in order to capture dynamic effects in the composition of public education expenditures.
Further control variables are: (i) the population share of each of the age groups relevant for
the three educational programs, which represent the “theoretical demand” for the three types
of education expenditures; (ii) GDP per capita, which captures how a country’s income level
is related to the structure of education expenditures; (iii) a measure of government ideology,
which controls for systematic partisan biases in education expenditures; and (iv) an index of
democracy, which measures to what extent the government is accountable to the electorate.
We associate individuals aged 5 to 10 years with primary education, individuals aged 11
to 15 years with secondary education, and individuals aged 16 to 24 years with tertiary edu-
cation. Even though this is only a rough approximation of the theoretical demand as the ages
at which the three educational stages begin vary between countries, it should be sufficiently
accurate. The ideology variable is a dummy that is 1 when the government is left-wing with
respect to economic policy, and else 0.9 The democracy index is 1 when citizens possess the
highest and 7 when they possess the lowest amount of political rights. All control variables
and their sources are listed in table 4.
9Note that this ideology variable is derived from the DPI dataset. Whereas this dataset distinguishes
between right, center, left, and other governments, we use, for compactness, a 0 - 1 classification. We code
observations with governments that are explicitly identified as left-wing as 1 and all other observations as 0.
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The unbalanced dataset covers altogether 121 countries, both developing and developed,
over the 1992 - 2006 period.10 Summary statistics for all variables used in the subsequent
regressions are collected in table 5; a list of the countries that are considered in this study
can be found in table 6. Both tables are in the appendix.
4.2 Empirical strategy
We estimate three dynamic panel data models to analyze the effect of globalization on the
composition of public education expenditures. The three models take into account that the
overall effect of globalization may differ between developing and industrialized countries. In
each of the three cases, the estimation model is specified as follows:
Expshareit = αExpsharei,t−1 + δGlobalizationit ∗ IND + γGlobalizationit ∗DEV
+ βxit+ωt+λi+it, (4.1)
where Expshareit is the share of public education expenditures allocated to either primary,
secondary, or tertiary education, Expsharei,t−1 represents the lag of the dependent variable,
λi are the country fixed effects, ωt are the year fixed effects, xit represents a vector of control
variables, and it is the error term.
Note that analyzing these three expenditure categories simultaneously is not redundant
since there are certain education expenditures that cannot be allocated to any of these three
categories, so that the shares of primary, secondary, and tertiary education expenditures in
total education expenditures do generally not sum up to 100% (see figure 1).
Two variables are used in model 4.1 to explore the effect of globalization in industrial-
ized and developing countries. The first variable is constructed by interacting a measure of
globalization with a dummy variable, IND, that is 1 for industrialized countries and else 0.
The second variable is constructed by interacting the same measure of globalization with a
dummy variable, DEV , that is 1 for developing countries and else 0. We classify all countries
as either industrialized or developing (see table 6).11 We are interested in the estimates for δ
and γ, the coefficients on the interaction variables: δ measures the effect of globalization in
industrialized countries, whereas γ measures its effect in developing countries.
10Since fixed effects are included in the empirical model (4.1), each of the included countries has at least
two non-missing observations during the time frame of the analysis.
11Any classification of countries as industrialized or developing is of course arbitrary. We classify only OECD
countries as industrialized. Therefore, the term developing as used in this paper should not be understood as
being synonymous with, for example, the Least Developed Countries (LDC). It should rather be understood
as encompassing all countries except the most wealthy.
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Note that we do not include the industrialized and developing country dummies, i.e., the
“lower-order” effects of these dummies, as separate control variables in equation 4.1 because
they are multicollinear with the country fixed effects. We also do not include a lower-order
effect for the globalization variable because it is multi-collinear with a linear combination of
the interaction effects. It may seem that the non-inclusion of the lower-order effects leads to
an omitted variable bias (Braumoeller, 2004). This concern is, however, unwarranted.12
Due to the presence of the fixed effects and the lagged dependent variable in equation 4.1,
pooled OLS estimations are inconsistent. However, it is a well-known fact that the application
of the within-estimator to dynamic models also yields biased estimates (Nickell, 1981). While
the within-estimator is consistent and the Nickell-bias can be ignored when T is large, this
bias may be serious in panels with a small time dimension. In order to shed light on the
question what a large T means in the given context, Judson and Owen (1999) find that even
in panels with T = 30, the estimated coefficient may have a bias of up to 20% of the true
value. Since T is equal to 15 in our dataset, it is obvious that more sophisticated estimation
methods are required for the empirical analysis.
Several IV and GMM estimators have been developed in order to deal with the bias
in dynamic panel data models. For models where it cannot be assumed that disturbances
are spherical, the Arellano-Bond Difference GMM and Blundell-Bond System GMM estima-
tors outperform their alternatives (Roodman, 2009b). Between these two, the choice of the
appropriate estimator depends on whether the dependent variable is persistent or not. For
persistent dependent variables, there is evidence that the Difference-GMM estimator gives rise
to finite sample biases. In this case, the System-GMM estimator is recommended (Blundell
and Bond, 1998; 2000). Since education expenditures are likely to be persistent, we apply
the robust one-step System-GMM estimator. Moreover, we use a collapsed “GMM-style”
instruments set to address the instrument proliferation problem (Roodman, 2009a).13
12To see why, note that the complete specification of a model with country fixed effects and interactions of a
continuous control variable with a dummy variable is: yit = αi+β1di+β2xit+β3dixit+it, with di ∈ {0, 1} (we
omit other control variables for brevity). Thus, β2 is the marginal effect of x when di = 0 whereas β2+β3 is the
marginal effect when di = 1. This expression is equivalent to yit = αi+β1di+β2(dixit+(1−di)xit)+β3dixit+it,
which can be rewritten as yit = αi +β1di +β2(1−di)xit +(β2 +β3)dixit + it, or yit = zi +γcixit +δdixit + it,
with zi = αi+β1di, ci = (1−di), γ = β2, δ = (β2+β3). This last expression has the same structure as equation
4.1. Since it is equivalent to the complete specification, the same is true for equation 4.1.
13Without collapsing, the instruments count can be as high as 240.
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5 Estimation results
5.1 Baseline regressions
The results for the System-GMM estimations of model 4.1 are collected in table 1. In the
first three models (column 2 to 4), the KOF-Index is used as the proxy for globalization,
while the last three models (column 5 to 7) are estimated using the trade openness measure.
There are three models for each globalization proxy due to the fact that we use three different
dependent variables: the share of primary, secondary, and tertiary education spending. The
dependent variables represent the expenditures at each of the three education levels divided
by total education expenditures.
First, note that the diagnostic tests reported at the bottom of table 1 confirm the validity
of the set of instruments for all models. This can be deduced from the fact that the Hansen-J
overidentification test is never rejected, while in addition second-order autocorrelation in the
differenced errors is not found for any of the models (first-order autocorrelation in the differ-
enced errors is expected and does not invalidate the estimates). The number of instruments is
also smaller than the number of cross-sections, so that a bias due to instrument proliferation
is not likely (see also section 5.2 for the findings from robustness checks).
The estimates suggest that deepening globalization leads to lower spending for primary
relative to tertiary education in both industrialized and developing countries. The coefficients
for the interaction variables, irrespective of whether the KOF-Index or the openness variable
is used, is negative in the model for primary and positive in the model for tertiary education
expenditures. The coefficients are, with one exception, at least significant at the 10% level and
in some cases even significant at the 1% level. Generally, it can be said that the significance
levels for the globalization coefficient are higher when using the KOF-index. This is in line
with our expectations since it is much more comprehensive than the trade openness measure.
The magnitudes of the estimated effects in industrialized and developing countries are
remarkably similar. A one-point increase in the KOF-Index reduces the share of primary
education expenditures by around 0.135 percentage points in industrialized and by about 0.141
percentage points in developing countries. At the same time, it increases the share of tertiary
education expenditures by 0.112 and by 0.106 percentage points, respectively. A one-point
increase in the trade openness measure reduces the share of primary education expenditures
by around 0.036 percentage points in industrialized and by about 0.020 percentage points in
developing countries, and it increases the share of tertiary education expenditures by 0.013
and by 0.003 percentage points, respectively.
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The remaining control variables perform reasonably. The lagged dependent variable is signifi-
cantly positive with a coefficient between 0.4 and 0.6 for all expenditure categories, suggesting
a high degree of persistence in the composition of education expenditures. In addition, we
find that there is a positive relationship between the population share relevant for primary
and secondary education and expenditures for primary and secondary education, whereas an
increase in the population share relevant for tertiary education has no effect on expenditures.
This is consistent with the notion that primary and the earlier parts of secondary education
are usually compulsory, so that a larger number of children in the age group relevant for these
education levels directly increases spending needs.
Another variable that is significant in some models is the democracy index which is
consistently negative in the model for primary education and positive in the models for
secondary and tertiary education. Taking into account that the democracy index is 1 when
citizens possess the highest and 7 when they possess the lowest amount of political rights, we
find that ceteris paribus more democratic countries spend more on lower relative to higher
educational programs. This can be attributed to the fact that a deepening of democracy
usually suggests an extension of political rights to the less wealthy part of society. These
groups in turn benefit more from primary than from tertiary education.
The coefficient for GDP per capita is insignificant in all models but one. In the re-
gressions using tertiary education expenditures as the dependent variable and openness as
a proxy for globalization (last column of table 1), it has a positive coefficient significant at
the 5% level. This would suggest that the more wealthy a country is the higher is the share
of public resources intended for education that this country allocates to higher education.
Finally, the coefficient for government ideology is insignificant suggesting that there are no
systematic partisan biases in the allocation of public education expenditures. This is not
surprising given that the evidence in favor of partisan biases at higher levels of aggregation
of public expenditures is generally quite weak.
5.2 Sensitivity analysis
This section provides the results for two robustness checks that are conducted in addition to
the fact that we employ two different globalization measures. The estimations in tables 2 and
3 address potential deficiencies of the estimations in table 1 from an econometric viewpoint.
The first robustness check involves a re-estimation of the models in table 1 by means of a
a two-step procedure using the Windmeijer-correction instead of the robust one-step proce-
dure. While the two-step procedure is asymptotically efficient and robust to arbitrary forms
of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, the Windmeijer-correction is used to deal with a
potential finite sample bias in the calculation of the associated standard errors. Without the
correction, a downward bias in the standard errors is possible (Windmeijer, 2005).
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Generally, we find that the results in table 2 confirm the conclusions drawn with regard to
the estimation results in table 1, even though the overall significance of the coefficients is
lower. In the regressions using the KOF-Index as a proxy for globalization (columns 2 to 4),
the coefficient for globalization is insignificant in the primary education expenditure model,
but continues to be significantly positive for tertiary education expenditures. The size of the
coefficient is also very similar to the results in table 1. This suggests that expenditures are
still shifted towards higher education, even though it is not clear at the cost of which other
category this occurs. The coefficient for primary expenditures continues to be negative, even
though the t-statistic is now only at around -1.2 to -1.3.
When the trade openness variable is used (column 5 to 7), the coefficient for globalization
is less significant than in columns 2 to 4. This coincides with our findings in table 1 and can
be explained by the fact that the KOF-Index is the more appropriate and more comprehensive
measure. In the regressions based on the trade openness measure, the globalization coefficient
is only significantly negative for industrialized countries in the model for primary education
expenditures. Hence, according to this measure, globalization does not affect the share of
expenditures on primary education in developed countries and the tertiary expenditure share
in any of the two country groups. Finally, it should be noted that the signs and levels of
significance of the remaining control variables is very similar to the results presented in the
baseline estimations.
The second robustness check addresses the instruments proliferation bias problem. Rood-
man (2009a) argues that when too many instruments are used Sargan and Hansen J-tests used
for testing instrument validity become weak and unreliable. In tables 1 and 2 we have already
addressed this issue by collapsing the instruments matrix. Another approach would be to only
use the first lags as instruments. This is the approach pursued in table 3.
The estimation results in table 3 are based on the same models as in tables 1 and 2.
With regard to the estimations using the KOF-Index, we can say that the coefficients for
primary and tertiary education expenditures have the same sign and are significant both for
developing and developed countries. While the size of the globalization coefficient for primary
education expenditures is still at around -0.1, it is by about 50% smaller for tertiary education
expenditures compared to the results in table 1. However, the coefficient is still quite large
since a 10-point increase in the KOF-Index would lead to an increase in the share of higher
education expenditures by 0.6 percentage points.
In columns 5 to 7 (based on the openness measure), only the coefficient for primary ed-
ucation expenditures continues to be significant, while in column 7, the t-statistic for tertiary
education expenditures is -1.62, which almost corresponds with significance at the 10% level.
Finally, it should be noted that the results for the control variables are again very similar to
those in table 1. The only difference that emerges is that the coefficient for GDP per capita
is now even insignificant in column 7.
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The estimation results collected in tables 1 to 3 clearly suggest that the share of higher
education expenditures has increased due to globalization. Some of the estimation models,
especially those in table 1, suggest that this shift in educational priorities has occurred at the
expense of primary education expenditures. The effect is larger and more robust in terms of
statistical significance when the KOF-Index is used as a proxy for globalization instead of the
more traditional trade openness measure. This is not surprising given that the dimensions of
globalization captured by globalization coincide more strongly with our theoretical considera-
tions in section 3. It is obvious that an individual’s decision to emigrate or not is not affected
by trade flows but rather by issues such as cultural proximity, language competencies or the
difficulty of obtaining a work permit in a foreign country.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzes whether globalization affects educational policies by studying its effect
on the composition of public education expenditures. We first derived theoretically that
globalization affects public education expenditures through two separate channels. On the
one hand, globalization changes the returns to different types of labor. This effect provides
governments with an incentive to increase expenditures for those educational programs for
which returns increase more. On the other hand, globalization affects education expenditures
through its effect on the equilibrium tax rate. It was, however, not possible to determine
the sign of this effect analytically and to derive how globalization affects absolute education
expenditures. However, the theoretical discussion suggested that governments will spend less
on lower relative to higher educational programs with increasing globalization.
In a second step, we explored this hypothesis empirically with data on 121 countries
over the 1992 - 2006 period. Overall, the results are fairly unambiguous, even though they
are less robust when using the trade openness measure as a proxy for globalization rather
than the KOF-Index. We find that globalization reduces the share of education expenditures
allocated to primary education and increases the share allocated to tertiary education in both
developed and developing countries. This paper therefore suggests that globalization, in the
long run, increases income inequality due to its effect on educational policies.
During the theoretical discussion in section 3, we assumed that a random fraction of
individuals obtains primary degrees for given primary education expenditures. But those
who successfully participate in primary education are usually not determined randomly. It
is likely that students who originate from richer households will require less public resources
to complete primary education because they have a more effective private support network.
It will therefore be children from poorer households who will be denied a reasonable primary
education if the educational priorities of the government shift due to globalization.
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This paper can be extended in several ways. First, one could explore whether absolute
expenditures for the different educational programs have been affected by globalization. It is
possible that primary education expenditures, while declining as a share of total education
expenditures, have increased in absolute amount, and this might mitigate the negative dis-
tributional implications to some extent. Second, the interactions between globalization and
private education expenditures should be analyzed in more detail given that private educa-
tional institutions play a role in many countries. Third, it might be worthwhile to analyze
whether globalization has led to institutional reforms of public education systems that af-
fect educational outcomes of disadvantaged children. For example, it is well known that the
extent of academic tracking determines educational outcomes (Hanushek and Woessmann,
2006), and globalization may be related to such features of educational systems. Extending
this paper along these lines is therefore a promising avenue for future research.
Appendix A
This appendix derives how globalization affects the domestic tax rate in equilibrium. Implic-
itly differentiating equation (3.10) gives:
− dνmdwm dwmdG − dνmdgm
dgm
dG +
∫ 1
0
(
− 1b dwidG tνi − 1bwi dtdGνi − (1bwit− pii)( dνidwi
dwi
dG +
dνi
dgi
dgi
dG )
+(−1bwi dtdG + (1− t)dwidG + 1b dxdG)νi
)
di = 0.
Note that we have used that d2pii/dt2 = 0, d2pii/dtdx = 0, and d2pii/dtdwi = −1/b. It is im-
mediately clear from this expression that the sign of dt/dG depends on dx/dG and dwi/dG,
in addition to dgi/dG which is an endogenous variable and is thus determined within the
system. The overall effect of globalization is therefore ambiguous.
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Appendix B
Table 4: Definitions and Sources of Variables
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION SOURCE
Dependent variables
Primary education Primary education expenditures as a share of total 
expenditures public expenditures on education
Secondary education Secondary education expenditures as a share of total World Bank Edstats
expenditures public expenditures on education database
Tertiary education Tertiary education expenditures as a share of total
expenditures public expenditures on education
Proxies for globalization
Globalization KOF-Index of globalization Dreher (2006a)
Openness (Exports + Imports / GDP) in constant prices Penn World Tables 6.3
Control variables
Primary Share of total population aged 5 to 10 years 
population
Secondary Share of total population aged 11 to 15 years World Bank Edstats
population database
Tertiary Share of total population aged 16 to 24 years
population
GDP per capita PPP-adjusted GDP per capita in constant prices Penn World Tables 6.3
Government Index of government ideology with respect to Own collection based on
ideology economic policy (left-wing = 1, else = 0) DPI (Beck et al., 2001)
Democracy Index of political rights scaled from 1 = most free
Freedom House
until 7 = least free
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Table 5: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Std. dev. Observations
Primary education Overall 32.5 9.28 74.36 11.49 603
expenditures Between 14.68 69.47 11.95 97
Within 16.13 50.95 4.09 6.22
Secondary education Overall 35.24 1.9 73.12 10.51 666
expenditures Between 2 68.14 11.13 101
Within 7.78 51.57 4.47 6.59
Tertiary education Overall 19.3 2.67 36.82 6.86 775
expenditures Between 5.15 34.81 6.58 112
Within 2.49 35.34 3.3 6.92
KOF-Index Overall 63.38 22.57 92.14 15.96 798
Between 27.82 90.89 15.22 116
Within 41.48 76.93 4.93 6.88
Economic openness Overall 81.83 16.64 328.81 41.68 821
Between 22.9 311.65 43.17 121
Within 27.49 140.01 12.38 6.79
Primary population Overall 13.09 6 22.38 4.68 821
Between 6.76 21.7 4.64 121
Within 8.19 18.42 0.89 6.79
Secondary population Overall 7.29 3.78 11.58 2.05 821
Between 4.12 11.15 2.01 121
Within 5.95 8.95 0.37 6.79
Tertiary population Overall 15.29 9.05 22.89 2.87 821
Between 10.33 21.84 2.68 121
Within 11.76 18.4 0.81 6.79
GDP per capita Overall 13.95 0.59 47.25 11.14 821
Between 0.62 42.9 10.58 121
Within 1.54 24.49 2.15 6.79
Government ideology Overall 0.35 0 1 0.48 821
Between 0 1 0.4 121
Within -0.55 1.24 0.3 6.79
Democracy Overall 2.84 1 7 2.12 821
Between 1 7 2.11 121
Within 0.34 6.34 0.51 6.79
1 The number of observations is larger than in tables 1 to 3 because the regressions use lags.
2 Note that the number of countries for which data is available differs between the three expenditure categories.
Since for instance, data for secondary education expenditures is available for some countries for which tertiary
expenditure data is not available, the total number of countries amounts to 121.
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Table 6: Countries included in the sample
Argentina Greece (I) Norway (I)
Australia (I) Guatemala Oman
Austria (I) Guinea Pakistan
Azerbaijan Guyana Panama
Bahrain Hungary (I) Paraguay
Bangladesh Iceland (I) Peru
Barbados India Philippines
Belarus Indonesia Poland (I)
Belgium (I) Iran Portugal (I)
Belize Ireland (I) Romania
Bolivia Israel Russia
Brazil Italy (I) Samoa
Bulgaria Jamaica Saudi Arabia
Burundi Japan (I) Senegal
Cambodia Jordan Singapore
Cameroon Kazakhstan Slovak Republic (I)
Canada (I) Kenya Slovenia
Cape Verde Korea, Republic of (I) South Africa
Chad Kuwait Spain (I)
Chile Kyrgyzstan Sri Lanka
China Laos St. Lucia
Colombia Latvia Swaziland
Congo, Republic of Lebanon Sweden (I)
Costa Rica Lesotho Syria
Cote d‘Ivoire Lithuania Tajikistan
Cuba Macedonia Thailand
Cyprus Madagascar Togo
Czech Republic (I) Malawi Trinidad & Tobago
Denmark (I) Malaysia Tunisia
Dominican Republic Maldives Turkey (I)
Ecuador Mauritania Ukraine
Egypt Mauritius United Arab Emirates
El Salvador Mexico (I) United Kingdom (I)
Eritrea Mongolia United States (I)
Estonia Morocco Uruguay
Ethiopia Namibia Vanuatu
Fiji Nepal Venezuela
Finland (I) Netherlands (I) Vietnam
France (I) New Zealand (I) Zambia
Gambia, The (I) Nicaragua
Germany (I) Niger
1 This table lists all countries that are included in at least one of the estimated models.
2 Countries classified as “industrialized” are indicated with an “I” in parentheses (see foot-
note 7 for an explanation of the criteria according to which a country is classified as
developing or industrialized).
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